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INTRODUCTION 
In the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,1 the framers supposedly 
intended to mandate a separation of church and state.  The Supreme Court has 
                                                          
 * Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., 
Stanford Law School.  I give my thanks to the Thomas Jefferson School of Law for generous 
research funding. 
 
1
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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treated this statement as a truism.2  Given how the Establishment Clause is equated 
with church-state separation, one finds surprisingly little evidence that the framers 
intended anything like church-state separation.   
This article asserts that the church-state separation interpretation of 
Establishment Clause history is simply wrong.  The framers were focused on the first 
five words of the amendment, which read: “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  The 
original Establishment Clause was a guarantee that the federal government would 
not interfere in state regulation of religion—whatever form that state regulation took.  
Rather than enacting the Establishment Clause to mandate a separation of church and 
state, the framers adopted the clause to protect divergent state practices—including 
state establishment of religion, which continued in several states when the 
Establishment Clause was enacted.  As Thomas Jefferson himself later 
acknowledged, the Establishment Clause had much in common with the Tenth 
Amendment, which also protected states’ rights from federal interference. 
Part II of this article reviews federal laws and practices at the time when the 
Establishment Clause was enacted.  Part II notes that the prevalence of government 
aid to religion in early America is inconsistent with contentions that the 
Establishment Clause mandated a separation of church and state. 
Part III reviews some of the congressional discussions that resulted in the 
enactment of the Establishment Clause.  Part III concludes that nothing in the 
legislative history relating to the Establishment Clause suggests that the framers 
intended to endorse a separation of church and state.  To the contrary, this history 
indicates that by adopting the Establishment Clause, the framers agreed that the 
federal government would not interfere in state religious regulation. 
Part IV concludes that with respect to the Establishment Clause, the framers were 
committed to the principal of federalism.  Of the framers, Jefferson has been closely 
connected with arguments for church-state separation, given his Jefferson’s letter 
that described a “wall of separation between Church and State.”3  Although Jefferson 
wrote about the Establishment Clause on a number of other occasions, none of these 
writings advocated a policy of church-state separation.  Instead, Jefferson wrote that 
the power to regulate religion must “rest with the States, as far as it can be in any 
human authority.”4  In other words, Jefferson viewed the Establishment Clause as 
endorsing the non-interference principle described in Part III.   
After discussing Jefferson’s writings, Part IV reviews other statements about the 
Establishment Clause penned during the framing period.  Jefferson’s federalist 
description of the Establishment Clause was not an aberration.  Like Jefferson, other 
                                                          
 
2
 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (citing “the wall of separation 
that must be maintained between church and state” as a basis for striking down some forms of 
state aid to private religious schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (holding that 
prayer in the public schools “breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church 
and State”). 
 
3
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 
1, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281, 282 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 
1905).   
 
4
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 428, 428 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905) (hereinafter 
“Letter to Reverend Miller”). 
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framing era sources largely omit any discussion of church-state separation.  Also like 
Jefferson, framing era sources again and again state that the Establishment Clause 
was adopted to preclude federal interference in state regulation of religion.          
Part V reviews the origins of modern Establishment Clause activism in Everson 
v. Board of Education.5  Part V discusses the surprisingly sloppy and inaccurate 
statement of Establishment Clause history in Everson, which culminated with Justice 
Hugo Black’s conclusion that the framers enacted the Establishment Clause to 
mandate a separation of church and state. 
Part V discusses the bitter irony in the modern Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause activism.  The framers enacted the Establishment Clause as a shield, to 
protect state religious regulation from federal interference.  However, the Supreme 
Court has transformed the Establishment Clause into a sword, which gives federal 
judges the power to meddle in areas traditionally reserved to the states.  Through bad 
history and questionable public policy, the Supreme Court has created an 
Establishment Clause that is the exact opposite of what the framers intended. 
II.  LAWS AND STATEMENTS IN THE EARLY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Early federal laws and practices are entirely inconsistent with the argument that 
the Establishment Clause mandated the separation of church and state.  Just three 
days before Congress enacted the Establishment Clause, the same Congress 
approved a salary for a chaplain to lead Congress in prayer.  Presidents Washington, 
Adams, and Madison each established a national holiday for prayer.  In addition, a 
number of early statesmen—including President Washington—spoke of the 
importance of an active role for religion in public life.  In short, the practices and 
statements of the early federal government were contrary to a separation of church 
and state.    
A.  Early Federal Laws and Practices 
1.  Thanksgiving Proclamations 
The first Congress urged President Washington to proclaim “a day of public 
thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the 
many and signal favors of Almighty God.”6  President Washington selected 
November 26, 1789 as a day of thanksgiving to offer “our prayers and supplications 
to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations . . . .”7  Although Jefferson broke from this 
practice when he served as President, both John Adams and James Madison 
designated special days for Thanksgiving and prayer.8 
                                                          
 
5
 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 
6
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, PROCLAMATION FOR A NATIONAL THANKSGIVING (Oct. 3, 
1789), reprinted in 12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: BEING HIS 
CORRESPONDENCE, ADDRESSES, MESSAGES, AND OTHER PAPERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 
119 (1834). 
 
7
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, PROCLAMATION FOR A NATIONAL THANKSGIVING (Oct. 3, 
1789), reprinted in 1 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 64 (1899). 
 
8
 JOHN ADAMS, PROCLAMATION FOR A NATIONAL FAST (Mar. 6, 1799) (quoting 
Proverbs 14:34), reprinted in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 172, 173 (1850) (recommending that “that Thursday, the twenty-fifth day of 
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2.  Legislative Prayer and Military Chaplains 
As Christopher Lund has demonstrated,9 legislative prayer was a widely 
recognized practice in early America.  The first federal legislative prayer dates from 
the 1774 meeting of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia.10  In the following 
years, both the House and Senate began their sessions with a prayer.  By 1789, the 
practice was so well-established that both houses of Congress appointed chaplains.  
On September 22, 1789, Congress enacted a statute, setting the chaplains salaries at 
$500 a year.11  This act was passed just three days before Congress reached 
agreement on the bill of rights—including the Establishment Clause.12 
Like legislative prayer, federal support for military chaplains was in place long 
before Congress adopted the Establishment Clause and continued after the clause 
was enacted.  In 1775, the Continental Congress approved the first army chaplain.13  
In addition to authorizing legislative prayer, the first Congress enacted a statute that 
provided for chaplains for the army.14  The practice of appointing and paying army 
chaplains has continued up to the present day.15 
The practice of appointing and compensating chaplains involved the direct 
financial support of religion by the federal government.  If the Establishment Clause 
required a separation of church and state, such direct federal financing of religion 
would have been inconsistent with the clause.  Nonetheless, the first Congress 
approved such financial support, without any suggestion that the aid violated the 
Establishment Clause.  This congressional action raises considerable doubt about 
whether the framers read the Establishment Clause as requiring a separation of 
church and state.  
3.  The Kaskaskia Indian Treaty 
In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson proposed a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indian 
Tribe.   Jefferson’s proposal would appropriate federal funds to build a Catholic 
church on the tribe’s lands, and would provide a salary to support a Catholic priest 
who would tend to the tribe’s spiritual needs.  The treaty ultimately ratified by 
                                                          
April next, be observed, throughout the United States of America, as a day of solemn 
humiliation, fasting, and prayer”); JAMES MADISON, A PROCLAMATION, reprinted in 1 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 513 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1899) (noting James Madison’s July 9, 1812 Proclamation calling 
for a day of thanksgiving and prayer). 
 
9
 Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1171 (2009). 
 
10
 Id. at 1177. 
 
11
 Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 70-72. 
 
12
 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).  See also Lund, supra note 9, at 1184. 
 
13
 Klaus J. Herrmann, Some Considerations on the Constitutionality of the United States 
Military Chaplaincy, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 24, 24-25 (1964). 
 
14
 Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 222-24. 
 
15
 See Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Military Chaplains and the First 
Amendment, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 167 (2007) (describing military chaplains as 
“[p]atently unconstitutional under almost any view of the Establishment Clause”). 
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Congress provided: “And whereas the greater part of said tribe have been baptized 
and received into the Catholic Church, to which they are much attached, the United 
States will give annually, for seven years, one hundred dollars towards the support of 
a priest of that religion, who will engage to perform for such tribe the duties of his 
office, and also to instruct as many of their children as possible, in the rudiments of 
literature, and the United States will further give the sum of three hundred dollars, to 
assist the said tribe in the erection of a church.”16 
Notably, this treaty was proposed by President Jefferson.  Courts and scholars 
have long associated Jefferson as the foremost proponent of the separation of church 
and state.17  Yet it was Jefferson who convinced Congress to fund both the 
construction of a Catholic church, and the funding of a Catholic priest. 
4.  References to Religion in the Northwest Territory Ordinance, the Declaration of 
Independence and State Constitutions   
Outside of the First Amendment, and the Article IV provision prohibiting 
religious tests as a qualification for office,18 the United States Constitution makes no 
reference to religion or God.  But during the framing period, it was common for 
constitutions and official documents to include such references.  As Professor Daniel 
L. Dreisbach observes: “The Declaration of Independence (1776), The Articles of 
Confederation (1781), virtually all state constitutions, and other official documents 
are replete with claims of Christian devotion and supplication to the Supreme 
Being.”19 
 The Declaration of Independence begins by noting that all persons “are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, 
and the Pursuit of Happiness.”20  During the framing period, state constitutions also 
commonly referred to God or religion.  For example, the Massachusetts Constitution 
of 1780 declared: “It is the right as well as the duty of all men . . . to worship the 
                                                          
 
16
 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: 
FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 167 
(1964). 
 
17
 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (noting the wall separation 
metaphor, which appeared in a letter written by Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist church).  See 
also infra text accompanying notes 61-62 (showing that Jefferson read the Establishment 
Clause as guaranteeing federalism, rather than as a separation of church and state). 
 
18
 Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution provides in part: “[N]o religious Test shall ever 
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 
19
 Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of 
Selected Nineteeth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in 
the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L.  REV. 927, 928-29 (1996).  
 
20
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe.”21  The Virginia 
Constitution of 1776 described religion as “the duty we owe to our Creator . . . .”22 
In an enactment much closer in time to the adoption of the First Amendment, the 
first Congress enacted a charter to govern the Northwest Territory in 1787.  Article 
III of the Northwest Territory Ordinance provided: “Religion, morality, and 
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”23  In this law, 
many of the same men who would later approve the First Amendment described 
“[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge” as “being necessary to good government.”  
One should ask whether these same men, when they adopted the Establishment 
Clause just a few short years later, now suddenly believed in the separation of church 
and state. 
5.  Conscientious Objector Provision   
In 1775, the Continental Congress exempt religious conscientious objectors from 
service in the Revolutionary War.  The conscientious objector resolution read:  
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear 
arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to their consciences, 
but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of 
universal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several 
colonies, and to do all other services to their oppressed Country, which 
they can consistently with their religious principles.24   
During the Civil War, conscription initially was left to the individual states.  
However, after the federal government took control of the conscription process, the 
1864 draft act exempted members of pacifist religious denominations from military 
service.25  That same year, the Confederacy also exempted religious conscientious 
objectors from conscription.26   
Many years later, Justice John Harlan, Jr. stated that the conscientious objector 
provisions violated the Establishment Clause because these provisions were 
inconsistent with “the neutrality principle.”27  Justice Harlan was correct in his 
                                                          
 
21
 MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. II, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 1889 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 
 
22
 VA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 16, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3814 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 
23
 Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50. 
 
24
 RESOLUTION OF JULY 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 189 (W. Ford ed. 1905 & photo. reprint 1968). 
 
25
 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1965). 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  The Welsh 
court plurality attempted to overcome the issue of religious favoritism by extending the 
conscientious objector statute to any person who “deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are 
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of 
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time . . . .”  Id. at 340. 
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observation that the conscientious objector provisions accorded special treatment to 
objectors with a religious opposition to war, as opposed to individuals who did not 
want to fight for other reasons.  But contrary to Justice Harlan’s conclusion, no 
evidence suggests that the framers believed that such a preference for religious 
motivations violated the Establishment Clause. 
B.  Religion And The Federal Republic: The Civic Republicans 
An important strand of early American thought asserted that religion was an 
essential component of what George Washington referred to as “national morality.”28  
Those who agreed with Washington on the connection between religious belief and 
good government have become known as “civic republicans.”  John Witte, Jr. writes 
that “consistent with Puritan views, civic republicans sought to imbue the public 
square with a common religious ethic and ethos—albeit one less denominationally 
specific and rigorous than that countenanced by the Puritans.”29  As Witte correctly 
observes, civic republican thought was one of many competing views on church-
state relationships.30  Nonetheless, the proponents of an active role for religion in 
government included Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and John Adams.  
Given the stature of these proponents, the framing era views on the importance of 
religion to political life cannot be dismissed lightly. 
George Washington noted in his farewell address: “Of all the dispositions and 
habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable 
supports.  In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to 
subvert these great pillars of human happiness—these firmest props of the duties of 
men and citizens.”31  Washington continued: “And let us with caution indulge the 
supposition that morality can be maintained without religion.  Whatever may be 
conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason 
and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in 
exclusion of religious principle.”32   
John Adams made a similar point in his correspondence, writing that the United 
States Constitution “was made only for a moral and religious people.  It is wholly 
inadequate to the government of any other.”33  Adams continued that government 
was not “capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and 
religion.”34  Connecticut Senator Oliver Ellsworth described religious institutions as 
                                                          
 
28
 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN 
HISTORY 173 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963). 
 
29
 John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 386 (1996).  See also Stephen M. 
Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why Does the Supreme 
Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 451-52 
(2006) (“In republican democratic terms, Protestantism supposedly imbued citizens with 
virtue and shaped their understanding of the common good.”). 
 
30
 Witte, supra note 29, at 378-88. 
 
31
 Washington, supra note 28, at 173. 
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the 
Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 229 (1854). 
 
34
 Id. 
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“eminently useful and important” to the new Republic.35  And Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph Story observed that “it is impossible for those, who believe in the truth of 
Christianity, as a divine revelation, to doubt, that it is the especial duty of 
government to foster, and encourage it among all the citizens and subjects.”36 
The civic republican perspective also was reflected in the Northwest Territory 
Ordinance.  As noted above, Article III of the Northwest Territory Ordinance 
provided that  “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge” were “necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind.”37 
A separation of church and state would be contrary to the philosophy expressed 
by these civic republicans.  Rather than desiring a separation of church and state, 
civic republicans viewed religion and morality as essential components of the state.  
For this reason, assistance and support of religion were critical state functions. 
1.  Summary 
In the early years of the United States, the actions of the federal government were 
not consistent with a desire to separate church and state.  To the contrary, the federal 
government endorsed legislative prayer, hired chaplains, built a church and hired a 
priest for the Kaskaskia Indian Tribe, and spoke of the importance of religion in the 
Northwest Territory Ordinance.  The ordinance was consistent with the philosophy 
of the civic republicans, who saw religion as necessary for good government.  In 
short, nothing in the early history of the federal government suggested an intent to 
separate church and state. 
III.  THE DRAFTING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A number of other authors have written a detailed, point-by-point description of 
each event that eventually resulted in the enactment of the Establishment Clause.38  
This section is not intended to duplicate their work.  Instead, this section focuses on 
particular events in the enactment of the Establishment Clause.  These events 
illustrate that a church-state separation principle was precisely contrary to what the 
framers intended.  Instead, the framers sought to insure that the federal government 
would not interfere with state regulation of religion. 
Congress enacted the Establishment Clause and the other provisions of the Bill of 
Rights in response to concerns raised by the Anti-Federalists.  The Anti-Federalists 
sought to prevent the formation of a federal government, arguing that states should 
not ratify the new Constitution.  The Anti-Federalists consistently stressed that the 
federal government would exercise tyrannical power, usurping state authority.  For 
example, an Anti-Federalist who wrote under the pen name “Federal Farmer” wrote: 
                                                          
 
35
 Oliver Ellsworth, Report of the Committee to Whom Was Referred the Petition of 
Simeon Brown and Other (1802), in 11 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 
371, 373 (Christopher Collier ed., 1967). 
 
36
 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 723 
(1833) (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991). 
 
37
 Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, art. III, 1 Stat. 50. 
 
38
 See, e.g., THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO 
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198-222 (1986). 
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“Instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators, 
and many magistrates, we see all important power collecting in one centre, where a 
few men will possess them almost at discretion.”39 
In their opposition to the Constitution the Anti-Federalists emphasized that the 
federal government would attempt to preempt state regulation of religion.  Professor 
Kurt Lash observes that among the Anti-Federalists, “the most common objection in 
regard to congressional power and the subject of religion was that Congress might 
attempt to regulate that subject as one of its express or implied responsibilities.”40  
As noted by Lash, the criticisms leveled by an Anti-Federalist writing under the pen 
name “An Old Whig” were typical:  
[I]f a majority of the continental legislature should at any time think fit to 
establish a form of religion, for the good people of this continent, with all 
the pains and penalties which in other countries are annexed to the 
establishment of a national church, what is there in the proposed 
constitution to hinder their doing so?  Nothing; for we have no bill of 
rights, and every thing therefore is in their power and at their discretion.41 
Similarly, at the New York ratifying convention, antifederalist Thomas Tredwell 
wished “that sufficient caution had been used to secure to us our religious liberties, 
and to have prevented the general government from tyrannizing over our consciences 
by a religious establishment.”42 
Those who sought ratification of the Constitution emphasized that the document 
did not give the federal government any authority to regulate religion.  For example, 
when he spoke to the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788, Madison said: “There is 
not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion.  Its 
least interference with it, would be a most flagrant usurpation.”43  As noted below, 
framers such as James Iredell in North Carolina and Edmund Randolph in Virginia 
repeated Madison’s assertion that the federal government had no power over 
religion.44 
To obtain ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists promised to amend the 
Constitution after the states had ratified the document.  Professor Robert Natelson 
writes that a central purpose of these amendments was to reassure moderates “that 
the states would retain wide jurisdiction exclusive of the central government.”45  
                                                          
 
39
 Letter from the “Federal Farmer” (Letter 5) (Oct. 13, 1787), in THE ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 295 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986). 
 
40
 See Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1084-85 
(1998). 
 
41
 Essays of An Old Whig, PHILADELPHIA INDEP. GAZETTER, Oct. 1787, Feb. 1788, 
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 37 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 
42
 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 399 (2d ed. 1836). 
 
43
 JAMES MADISON, REMARKS BEFORE THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (June 12, 
1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 88 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds., 1987). 
 
44
 See infra text accompanying notes 69-70. 
 
45
 Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 83 (2005). 
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Even with this promise, Professor Natelson reports that in several states the decision 
to ratify the Constitution passed by an extremely narrow margin.46 
In drafting the Bill of Rights, Congress sought to reassure uneasy constituents 
that the federal government would not interfere with the regulation of religion that 
took place in the states.  The original text of what became the Establishment Clause 
was consistent with this purpose.  James Madison’s original version of the First 
Amendment religion clause provided: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on 
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, 
nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, 
infringed.”47 
Madison’s draft was changed into the modern religion clauses largely as a result 
of Representative Fisher Ames, who successfully proposed the following change in 
Madison’s language: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to 
prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.”48  Much 
more clearly than Madison’s proposal, Ames’ language focuses on limiting the 
power of Congress and not the states.  One must also note that Ames was a 
representative of the State of Massachusetts.  Ames’ home state continued to enforce 
laws supporting the dominant Congregational Church for years after Congress 
enacted the Establishment Clause.  To take just one example, Massachusetts 
collected “religious assessments”—tax revenues paid directly to the Congregational 
Church.49  This practice continued until 1833.50 
To read the Establishment Clause as mandating a separation of church and state 
would mean that Fisher Ames wanted to require a separation of church and state, 
even though the state that Ames represented did not practice such a separation.  Why 
would Fisher Ames promote such a constitutional amendment?  The more plausible 
explanation is that Ames—and everyone else in Congress—regarded the 
Establishment Clause as limiting only the federal government, and not the states.  
Far from mandating a separation of church and state, the framers enacted the 
Establishment Clause to preserve diverse state methods of religious regulation—
including state establishments. 
Another exchange during the framers’ discussion of the First Amendment 
indicates that the amendment was designed to protect state religious establishments, 
rather than to mandate a separation of church and state.  During discussion of the 
Establishment Clause in the House of Representatives, Madison was questioned 
about whether the Establishment Clause might prohibit state establishments of 
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particular religions.  In response, Madison stated “that the purpose of his amendment 
was to recognize restrictions on congressional power.  He meant to assure 
[Congressman] Sylvester and [Congressman] Huntington that the amendment would 
not abolish state establishments, which seems to have been their fear.”51 
Throughout the discussions of the Establishment Clause in the First Congress, 
one searches in vain for any statement that the Establishment Clause was designed to 
mandate a “wall of separation” between church and state.  Instead, the amendment 
was enacted to insure that the federal government would not interfere with state 
regulation of religion—whatever form that regulation would take.  The 
Establishment Clause was cited as a means of protecting diverse state regulations of 
religion—including state establishments—rather than a proposal for mandating a 
universal separation of church and state.  
IV.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FEDERALISM 
Over the past 20 years, federalism has emerged as the central theme in attempts 
to understand the Establishment Clause.  Justice Clarence Thomas has endorsed this 
Federalist interpretation.  In a concurring opinion filed in Elk Grove Unified School 
District v. Newdow,52 Justice Thomas wrote: “[T]he Establishment Clause is best 
understood as a federalism provision—it protects state establishments from federal 
interference but does not protect any individual right.”53  Similarly, Professor Steven 
D. Smith has asserted that the religion clauses were “purely jurisdictional in 
nature.”54  In other words, Congress adopted the clauses “merely to assign 
jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states.”55  A number of other 
commentators have advanced similar readings of the Establishment Clause.56 
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A.  What Separation Of Church and State Meant to Jefferson 
The term “separation of church and state” appeared rarely, if at all, in discussions 
about the Establishment Clause in the First Congress, and in the state ratifying 
conventions.  Yet in his now famous 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, Thomas 
Jefferson wrote: “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole 
American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus 
building a wall of separation between Church & State.”57  Jefferson was a deliberate 
writer, who chose his words carefully.  When Jefferson chose the words “wall of 
separation between church and state,” what did he mean? 
In his book on Jefferson’s metaphor, Daniel L. Dreisbach concludes that 
Jefferson’s “wall” was intended to separate the federal government from regulation 
of religion, which was left to the states.  As Dreisbach observes: “There is little 
evidence to indicate that Jefferson thought the [wall of separation] metaphor 
encapsulated a universal principle of religious liberty or of the prudential 
relationships between religion and all civil government (local, state, and federal).”58  
Instead, the metaphor “affirmed the policy of federalism.”59 
Throughout his lifetime, Jefferson repeatedly stated his federalist views of the 
Establishment Clause.  In response to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Jefferson 
drafted the Kentucky Resolutions.  Jefferson’s draft states his view of the First 
Amendment and the Establishment Clause as a federalist provision.  The Alien and 
Sedition Acts were flawed because they regulated speech—a power that the 
Constitution had reserved for the states.  But beyond the acts themselves, Jefferson’s 
Kentucky Resolutions contained a remarkably clear statement of the Establishment 
Clause as a federalist provision.  Jefferson wrote that the federal government had “no 
power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, 
being delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . . [A]ll lawful powers 
respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the 
people . . . .”60 
In 1805, Jefferson returned to this federalist theme in his second inaugural 
address.  In the address, Jefferson asserted:  
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is placed by 
the constitution independent of the powers of the general [i.e. federal] 
government.  I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the 
religious exercises suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution 
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found them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church 
authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.61 
Once again, the passage provides a clear statement of Jefferson’s federalist 
interpretation of religious regulation.  Religious exercise was “independent of the 
powers of the federal government,” and could be regulated only by “State or Church 
authorities.”  
In a January 23, 1808 letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, Jefferson again stated this 
federalist theme clearly.  Jefferson wrote:  
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the 
Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their 
doctrines, discipline, or exercises.  This results not only from the 
provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment or free 
exercise of religion [the First Amendment], but from that also which 
reserves to the States the powers not delegated to the United States [the 
Tenth Amendment] . . .  It must then rest with the States, as far as it can 
be in any human authority.62 
Like the prior statements, this passage treats the First Amendment as a jurisdictional 
provision that prevents the federal government from “intermeddling with religious 
institutions.”  Any power to legislate with respect to religion must “rest with the 
states.”  Dreisbach concludes:  
Jefferson’s “wall,” like the First Amendment affirmed the policy of 
federalism.  This policy emphasized that all governmental authority over 
religious matters was allocated to the states . . .  Insofar as Jefferson’s 
“wall,” like the First Amendment, was primarily jurisdictional (or 
structural) in nature, it offered little in the way of a substantive right or 
universal principle of religious liberty.63 
B.  Other Federalist Interpretations of the Establishment Clause 
The preceding section focuses on Jefferson’s federalist view of the Establishment 
Clause, because Jefferson authored the “separation of church and state” metaphor 
that has proven so influential.  However, Jefferson’s federalist views were not 
unique or idiosyncratic.  To the contrary, during the founding period everyone 
understood that the Establishment Clause was a federalist provision.  In other words, 
the Establishment Clause was enacted in order to prevent federal interference with 
state regulation of religion, whatever form that regulation took. 
After Jefferson, Madison is the framing era figure who receives the most 
attention in the Supreme Court’s early Everson decision.  Justice Rutledge actually 
attached Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments as 
an appendix to his Everson dissent.  Like Jefferson, Madison did not endorse a 
separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.   
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Instead, Madison endorsed the same non-interference principle described by 
Jefferson.  For example, at the Virginia Ratifying Convention in 1788, Madison said 
that under the Constitution, “[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general 
government to intermeddle with religion.”64 
When Jefferson published the Kentucky Resolution in 1798, Madison published 
the Virginia Resolution.  Like the Kentucky Resolution, Madison’s resolution relied 
on the principle of federalism to protest the federal Alien and Sedition Acts.  
Notably, the Virginia Resolution asserted that the federal government had no power 
to regulate “the liberty of conscience, and of the press,” because such powers had not 
been “delegated by the Constitution, and consequently withheld from the [federal] 
government.”  In arguing that the federal government lacked the power to regulate 
the press, the Virginia Resolution relied on the premise that the federal government 
obviously lacked any power to interfere with the regulation of religion in the 
individual states.  Madison wrote: “Any construction or argument, then, which 
would turn the amendment into a grant or acknowledgment of power, with respect to 
the press, might be equally applied to the freedom of religion.”65 
Later in life, Madison came to endorse a separation of church and state, similar in 
many ways to modern separationist views.  In 1822, after Madison had served his 
two terms as president, Madison wrote to Edward Livingston, a prominent Louisiana 
lawyer who would later represent the state in the House of Representatives.  In this 
letter, Madison noted his “approbation” when the first Congress had “appointed 
Chaplains, to be paid from the Natl. [National] Treasury.”66  Madison also sought to 
qualify his Thanksgiving proclamations as “absolutely indiscriminate, and merely 
recommendatory; or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought 
proper might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their own 
faith & forms.”67  Madison concluded:  “Every new & successful example therefore 
of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters, is of importance.”68 
Madison’s statements in his letter to Livingston refer only to the relationship 
between the federal government and religion.  Nothing in this letter, or in other late 
writings by Madison, contends that the federal government should interfere with 
state regulation of religion.  To the contrary, Madison may have argued for a 
complete separation between the federal government and religion, in order to prevent 
the federal government from interfering with state religious regulation.  At any rate, 
it is unclear whether this letter, written by Madison in 1822, sheds much light on the 
original intent of the framers of Establishment Clause, enacted more than 20 years 
earlier.    
Like Jefferson and Madison, other framers endorsed the non-interference 
principle.  In their view, the individual states had plenary power to determine 
church-state relationships.  The First Amendment guaranteed that the federal 
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government would not interfere in whatever arrangements the states made.  For 
example, consider James Iredell’s statement before the North Carolina Ratifying 
Convention:   
Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular 
species of it, they would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject 
they have nothing to do with.  Each state, so far as the clause in question 
does not interfere, must be left to the operation of its own principles.69 
Similarly, during Virginia’s Ratification Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph 
stated that under the Constitution, “no power is given expressly to Congress over 
religion.”70 
In his treatise on the Constitution, Joseph Story noted the framers’ views that all 
power to regulate religion remained exclusively with the states.  Story wrote:  “[T]he 
whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, 
to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions . . 
. .”
71
  Similarly, William Rawle wrote in 1829:  “The first amendment prohibits 
congress from passing any law respecting an establishment of religion, or preventing 
the free exercise of it.  It would be difficult to conceive on what possible 
construction of the Constitution such a power could ever be claimed by congress.”72 
C.  Was Federal Support For Religion Consistent With Federalism? 
With the enactment of the Establishment Clause, the framers seemed to agree 
with James Madison’s 1788 statement before the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 
where Madison asserted:  “There is not a shadow of right in the general government 
to intermeddle with religion.  Its least interference with it, would be a most flagrant 
usurption.”73  But at the same time, the federal government designated holidays for 
prayer, authorized legislative prayer, appointed and compensated chaplains, and 
engaged in other acts designed to endorse and support religion.  If the federal 
government lacked the power to “intermeddle with religion,” how did the 
government have the authority to enact these measures that supported religion? 
At one point, Thomas Jefferson suggested that the federal government lacked 
such authority.  Unlike Presidents Washington and Adams before him and President 
Madison after him, Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiving proclamations.  In his 
1808 letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, Jefferson explained that he refused to issue these 
proclamations because the Constitution prohibited the federal government “from 
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intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises.”74  
Whether Jefferson in fact consistently viewed the Constitution as completely 
prohibiting any federal action in support of religion is debatable.  As noted above, in 
1803 Jefferson had endorsed a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indian Tribe that authorized 
the use of federal funds to finance the construction of a church on the tribe’s land 
and to compensate a Catholic priest for the tribe.75  This treaty suggests that in 
Jefferson’s view, the federal government could support religion without running 
afoul of the Establishment Clause. 
Even if Jefferson in fact read the Establishment Clause as mandating a complete 
prohibition on federal support for religion, the other framers seemed to agree on a 
less restrictive reading of the clause.  Consistent with the many statements quoted 
above, the Establishment Clause prohibited the federal government from interfering 
with any state’s regulation of religion.76  However, this did not mean that the federal 
government was categorically prohibited from aiding religion.  The federal 
government could aid religion, as long as this aid did not interfere with state 
religious regulation. 
In reviewing the federal support of religion described in Part II, it is apparent that 
none of these federal actions conflicted with state religious regulation.77  Authorizing 
prayers before meetings of the federal Congress, and appointing chaplains for the 
federal army would not conflict with state religious regulation.  Similarly, funding a 
church and priest for the Kaskaskia Indian Tribe would not conflict with state 
religious regulation, because the tribe was outside the states’ jurisdiction. 
Of the early federal initiatives relating to religion, the days of prayer proclaimed 
by early presidents were the only federal enactments that might possibly infringe on 
state authority.  But because all of the American states continued to endorse religion 
and prayer as a positive force, it is hard to see how a day of prayer would interfere 
with state religious regulation.  At least this seems to have been the judgments of 
Presidents Washington Adams, and Madison—who all issued Thanksgiving 
resolutions.   
V.  EVERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE ORIGINS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
DISTORTION 
In Everson v. Board of Education,78 the Supreme Court laid the foundation of 
modern Establishment Clause doctrine—including the emphasis on a “separation of 
church and state.”  As discussed above, the framers intended that the Establishment 
Clause would operate as a shield, insulating state regulation of religion from the 
federal government.  Beginning with Everson, modern doctrine has effectively stood 
the Establishment Clause on its head.  Everson and other modern Establishment 
Clause cases have effectively turned the Establishment Clause into sword, 
authorizing the federal government to interfere in areas traditionally regulated by the 
states.  
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Everson dealt with a New Jersey statute which required local school boards to 
reimburse private school students for the cost of bus transportation to school.79  
Justice Black’s majority opinion claimed to review the history of the Establishment 
Clause.  However, the history was not that of the Establishment Clause itself, but 
rather, of the successful battle for an end to religious assessments in the State of 
Virginia.  This was a serious error.  
According to the Everson majority, the dispute about the proper relationship 
between church and state “reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86 when 
the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia’s tax levy for the support 
of the established church.”80  The Court noted that Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison “led the fight against this tax.”81  The Everson majority further noted 
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, where 
Madison purportedly argued:  
that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either 
believer or non-believer, should be taxed to support a religious institution 
of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of 
men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions were the 
inevitable result of government-established religions.82 
The Court continued that the Virginia legislature not only declined to renew the 
tax levy, but also enacted Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Liberty.83  The Everson 
Court then quoted Jefferson’s bill:  “‘That no man shall be compelled to frequent or 
support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, 
restrained, molested, or burthened, in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, 
on account of his religious opinions or belief . . . .’”84   
The Court’s myopic focus on Virginia was odd.  In Everson, the Justices were 
interpreting the federal Establishment Clause, not the Virginia Bill for Religious 
Liberty.  This perplexing focus on the events in Virginia led the Court to make a 
serious error, which would distort the development of Establishment Clause law to 
the present day.  Writing for the Everson majority, Justice Black now asserted:  
“This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, 
in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading 
roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection 
against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”85 
The goals of Jefferson and Madison in advocating the Virginia Bill for Religious 
Liberty, and their goals in advocating the First Amendment were entirely different.  
In the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, Jefferson and Madison were advocating an 
approach for the single State of Virginia to a single problem—assessments collected 
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by the state, and paid to the dominant Anglican Church.  In the First Amendment, 
the framers were attempting to define the proper relationship between the federal 
government and the states.  This First Amendment was a complicated project 
because the thirteen states had developed several different approaches to the 
relationship between church and state.  To say that Madison and Jefferson had “the 
same objective” in drafting the Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom and the First 
Amendment was simply wrong. 
While Jefferson and Madison clearly played a pivotal role in the enactment of the 
United States Constitution and the First Amendment, Justice Black’s myopic 
Everson focus on Jefferson and Madison renders his historical account incomplete 
and inaccurate.  For example, Justice Black completely ignores George 
Washington’s Farewell Address, where Washington advocated the importance of 
religion in public life.  While Madison and Jefferson were important framers, they 
were not the only framers. 
Even with respect to the views of Madison and Jefferson, Justice Black’s account 
is seriously misleading.  Robert Cord writes that after reading the Everson decision, 
“one might come to the conclusion that Madison and Jefferson fought the battle for 
religious freedom in Virginia, wrote a few letters on the subject, and then retired.”86  
Justice Black’s majority opinion fails to mention any of the Federalist writings by 
Jefferson and Madison.  The Everson opinion completely omits any discussion of the 
Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, even though scholars always have treated these 
resolutions as some of the most important political documents from the early United 
States.  Either Justice Black was unaware of the resolutions or—worse yet—
deliberately declined to discuss the resolutions, because such a discussion would 
undermine Justice Black’s church-state separation principle. 
While the Everson majority opinion spent considerable time discussing the 
Virginia dispute on religious assessments, Justice Black entirely ignores the adoption 
of the federal Establishment Clause, even though this is the provision at issue in 
Everson.  As Robert Cord writes: “[T]he Everson opinion is devoid of any attempt to 
explore the actions and debates of the First Congress which proposed to the States 
what would become the First Amendment.”87  Obviously, this was a serious 
omission.  For example, the Everson Court entirely ignores the house discussion of 
the First Amendment, where Madison assured Representative Sylvester and 
Representative Huntington that the Establishment Clause “would not abolish state 
establishments.”88  This discussion is yet another piece of critical evidence that is not 
mentioned by the Everson Court. 
Given these wholesale omissions, it is not surprising that Justice Black’s 
discussion of Establishment Clause history contains misstatements.  Consider Justice 
Black’s concluding statement about the history of the Establishment Clause:    
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer 
one religion over another . . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion.89   
Justice Black continued:  “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between 
church and State.’”90 
Much of this statement is demonstrably wrong.  Consider Justice Black’s 
statement that “neither a State nor the Federal Government” could pass laws that 
“aid all religions.”  This article has presented a list of examples where the federal 
government did aid religion—including Thanksgiving proclamations, legislative 
prayer, the conscientious objector provision, and land grants to churches.   
Also, when the Establishment Clause was adopted, several states maintained 
established churches.91  If the Establishment Clause really did provide that a state 
could not aid religion, then the representatives from those states never would have 
voted for an amendment that outlawed their state’s practices.  To the contrary, one of 
the key proponents of the First Amendment was Fisher Ames, whose home state of 
Massachusetts collected tax assessments to support the dominant Congregational 
Church.  Justice Black’s account of history also ignores Madison’s own statement 
during the house debates, that the Establishment Clause “would not abolish state 
establishments.”92  This statement directly contradicts Justice Black’s claim that 
under the Establishment Clause, states could not aid religion. 
As a historical account, Justice Black’s Everson majority opinion is an abject 
failure.  But given the multitude of errors, one suspect’s that this opinion never really 
was about a faithful rendition of the original understanding of the Establishment 
Clause.93  Instead, the opinion was about reshaping history for another purpose.   
The Everson opinion was all about power.  Justice Black and his colleagues saw 
the Establishment Clause as a means for the federal courts to exercise power.  
Indeed, Supreme Court decisions since Everson have used the Establishment Clause 
to intrude into a variety of areas previously reserved for the states.  Federal courts 
have cited the Establishment Clause as a means of regulating private school 
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funding,94 public school curriculum and events,95 religious symbols,96 and 
miscellaneous cases involving state religious regulation.97 
The Court’s intervention in state affairs reached a particularly low point in 
Epperson v. Arkansas.98  In Epperson, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law that 
prohibited public school instructors from teaching the evolutionary account of man's 
origins.  The law intended to promote teaching creationism, or the biblical account of 
man’s origins. 
The Epperson Court wrote the anti-evolution law violated the Establishment 
Clause, because the law wasn’t “neutral.”99  The Justices wrote that Government 
“may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not 
aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even 
against the militant opposite.”100 
Of course, the anti-evolution law wasn’t “neutral.”  But any regulation specifying 
school curriculum won’t be neutral.  For example, laws requiring that students learn 
basic science and scientific methods aren’t “neutral.”  Religious believers may view 
such courses as improperly elevating empirical testing as the basis for wisdom, as 
opposed to the importance of belief based on faith.  Similarly, one might object to a 
curriculum that required (or prohibited) Ernest Hemingway’s classic short novel Old 
Man And The Sea, given the explicit religious symbolism used throughout the 
book.101  But given the popularity of both Hemingway and this book, no court has 
held that Old Man and The Sea amounts to an establishment of religion.  
                                                          
 
94
 Compare Zelman v. Simons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a state voucher 
program, where most voucher payments went to families with students attending private 
religious schools), with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down a state 
statute that authorized salary supplements for private school teachers). 
 
95
 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that a prayer at a graduation 
ceremony violated the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) 
(finding that a law mandating that public schools cannot teach evolution violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
 
96
 Compare McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that a 
Ten Commandments display in a courthouse violated the Establishment Clause), with Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display at the Texas 
state capital did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 
97
 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (illustrating a state law that 
gave employees the right to refuse work on their sabbath violated the Establishment Clause); 
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (creating a public school district that coincided 
with the neighborhood boundaries of a religious sect violated the Establishment Clause). 
 
98
 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97. 
 
99
 See id. at 103. 
 
100
 Id. 
 
101
 Hemingway’s short novel remains a popular work of literature, commonly assigned in 
high school courses.  Hemingway’s novel is about an old and unsuccessful fisherman who 
catches a huge marlin, only to have the fish devoured by sharks as he sails home.  Religious 
symbolism is prominent throughout the book.  The fisherman is named “Santiago”—Spanish 
for saint.  When he returns home exhausted, Santiago struggles to carry his ship’s mast to his 
shack—much as Christ carried the cross to his crucifixion.  And when Santiago sees the 
sharks coming for the marlin, Hemingway’s book reads:  “‘Ay,’ he said aloud.  There is no 
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Epperson involved the specter of federal intervention in its most heavy-handed 
and distasteful form.  While the Justices cited the Establishment Clause as authority 
for their objections to teaching creationism over evolution, this was clearly a pretext 
for federal judges who simply didn’t accept the plausibility of a creationist account 
of man’s origins.  In Epperson, the Justices seemed to be dictating to the Arkansas 
legislature how to run the state’s schools.  
The Establishment Clause activism in cases like Everson and Epperson 
represents a bitter irony.  The Establishment Clause was enacted to insulate state 
religious regulation from the federal government.  Yet in Epperson, the United 
States Court used the Establishment Clause—a provisions designed to protect state 
decisions from federal interference—as a basis for overturning a state legislative 
decision regarding school curriculum. 
Modern Establishment Clause cases have literally turned the clause on its head.  
The Establishment Clause was meant as a shield, to protect state religious regulation.  
But the Supreme Court has turned the Establishment Clause into a sword, precisely 
for the purpose of overturning these state decisions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A review of early American history demonstrates that the framers did not intend 
a separation of church and state.  The federal government appointed and 
compensated chaplains and priests, authorized legislative prayers, issued 
Thanksgiving proclamations, and endorsed many other measures intended to support 
religions.   
When the framers enacted the First Amendment clause prohibiting an 
“establishment of religion,” what did they mean?  Madison’s first draft of the First 
Amendment is instructive.  This draft provided: “The civil rights of none shall be 
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be 
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on 
any pretext, infringed.”102  As indicated by the subsequent remarks of Jefferson, 
Madison, and others, the Establishment Clause that eventually found its way into the 
First Amendment adopted this federalism principle.  The federal government had no 
power to intrude on state regulation of religious institutions, whatever form the state 
regulations might take.  Regardless of whether states enacted a no-aid policy, or 
provided generous preferential aid to a single state-established church, the federal 
government was powerless to interfere. 
During the framing period, no one believed that the Establishment Clause 
imposed a “wall of separation” between church and state.  The Establishment Clause 
was not designed to isolate the state from religion.  Rather, Jefferson’s metaphorical 
wall was designed to protect state regulation of religion from interference by the 
federal government.  In other words, the Establishment Clause was a shield, 
designed to protect the states from the federal government.  Paradoxically, the 
Supreme Court has used the Establishment Clause as a sword, to strike down state 
laws regulating religion.  In these decisions, the Court has turned the Establishment 
Clause on its head. 
                                                          
translation for this word and perhaps it is just a noise such as a man might make, involuntarily, 
feeling the nail go through his hands and into the wood.”  ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE OLD MAN 
AND THE SEA (1952). 
 
102
 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (emphasis added). 
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The concept of “separation of church and state” is an entirely artificial construct, 
having no basis in the language or history of the Establishment Clause.  Nonetheless, 
the so-called “church state separation principle” has served a purpose for the 
Supreme Court.  The Court has used this metaphor as a basis for regulating state aid 
to private schools, religion in the public schools, religious symbols, and other 
controversies. 
Perhaps the Court can justify such decision by invoking public policy—although 
the wisdom of such second-guessing of discretionary legislative decisions is highly 
problematic.  However, it is not possible to justify the Court’s intervention based on 
a historical church-state separation principle.  No such historical principle exists. 
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